Abstract
Introduction

22
It is well documented that the US skill premium (i.e. the wage of skilled workers relative to that of 23 
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70 labor are w s and w u , and ω ≡ w u / w s is the relative wage of unskilled labor, or the inverse of the 71 skill premium. For good z, a s (z) and a u (z) are the unit factor requirements, θ s (z) and θ u (z) are the 72 income shares of skilled and unskilled labor in production, and β(z) ≡ a s (z) / a u (z) is the skilled-73 labor intensity. In general, a s (z), a u (z), θ s (z), θ u (z) and β(z) may all depend on factor prices.
74
Assume that factor intensity reversal is absent and β(z) increases with z; i.e. skilled-labor 75 intensive goods have larger indices. To facilitate explaining the intuition of the results, assume 76 that the preferences are Cobb-Douglas with expenditure shares b(z) such that R 1 0 bðzÞdz ¼ 1.
77
Appendix 1 shows that all the results hold under the more general CES preferences.
78
There are two countries, the North and the South, and they are identical except that the North is goods [g, 1] and the South produces the unskilled-labor intensive goods [0, g] . In other words,
87
except for the common good g produced in both countries, every northern good is more skilled-88 labor intensive than every southern good.
89
For the good z, its price P(z) equals its marginal cost MC(z): where the last equality substitutes for MC(g) and MC*(g) using Eq. (1).
97
Moving on to the market for skilled labor in the North, the demand for skilled labor by good z is R 1 g bðzÞh u ðzÞdz ¼ w u L u =y. Take the ratio of these two market clearing conditions and re-arrange:
104 105 106
Eq. (3) says that the skill premium 1 / ω is inversely proportional to the relative skilled-labor 107 supply, γ, and proportional to the relative skilled labor demand, μ(.). Since μ(.) is the ratio of 108 the average income share of skilled labor to the average income share of unskilled labor, both weighted by the goods' expenditure shares, it can be thought of as the average skilled-labor 110 intensity, based on factor income shares, across all sectors of the northern economy.
111
Similarly for the South:
112 113 114
Finally, for every southern good z, the North's expenditure on it is yb(z), and so the North's 115 aggregate expenditure on the southern goods, or the value of the North's imports, is R g 0 ybðzÞdz.
116
Likewise, the value of the North's exports is R 1 g y * bðzÞdz. As international payments are balanced,
Since aggregate expenditure equals aggregate factor income, y = w s L s + 118 w u L u and y* = w s *L s * + w u *L u *. Substitute the expressions for y and y* into the balance-of-119 payments condition and re-arrange, using the assumption that L u = L u *: proportional to its relative supply and proportional to its relative demand.
130
The equilibrium is fully characterized by Eqs. (2)-(5), which jointly determine three relative 131 factor prices, ω, ω*, and w s / w s *, as well as the index of the common good, g. 
147 148 149 b ψ is the marginal increase in the log of the North's relative skilled labor demand, μ(.),
150
following the creation of the new goods. To better understand how the sign of b ψ is determined,
151
note that
152 153 154
Since Eq. (3) can be re-written as γ = ωμ(.), in equilibrium, γ equals the North's average 155 skilled-labor intensity based on factor quantities (i.e. physical units). Substituting for μ(.) in Eq.
156
(6) using this expression yields:
i.e. b ψ b 0 if the new goods are less skilled-labor intensive than average, and vice versa.
159
To solve for the change in the northern skill premium, totally differentiate Eq. (2) and the logs 
166 167 increases with β (z n ) because as β (z n ) increases, θ s (z n ) increases and θ u (z n ) decreases since θ s (z n ) + 182 θ u (z n ) = 1. Thus, the more the skilled-labor intensity of the new goods differs from the northern 183 average, the larger the magnitude of the domestic factor market effect. β (z n ) = γ. This line represents the domestic factor market effect.
187
The second term in Eq. (8) 
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To determine the sign of d(w s / w u ) in Fig increases. This is consistent with the finding of Zhu (2001), who considers the case of z n = 1.
216
Finally, consider introducing the same new goods, [z n , z n + dz n ], in a closed economy that 217 produces the goods [g, 1] . Then the international factor market effect is shut off, and in Fig. 1 As shown in the Mathematical Appendix, the change in the southern skill premium is: and international factor market effects work in the same direction, and the southern skill premium 270 necessarily increases.
271
The results concerning the changes in g are discussed in the Mathematical Appendix. diture shares of the old northern goods by proportionately more than the old southern goods.
289
One way to tackle the PIR is to add induced preference changes into the comparative static 290 exercises and crank out the results. However, this risks making the results messy and complex and 291 losing the intuition. Instead, consider the following two-step solution method.
Step 1 shows how 292 new northern goods change relative factor demand.
Step 2 then takes the changes in relative factor 293 demand as given and derives the changes of the skill premia (and the other endogenous variables).
294
The results from step 2 have the same intuition as those in Section 3. There, the results depend on The two-step solution method streamlines the process of tackling the PIR. Since the PIR 300 changes the way new goods affect relative factor demand, it affects step 1, and only step 1: step 2 301 starts from the given changes in relative factor demand and so is not affected by the PIR at all. , 2003; Schott, 2003) , the two-step solution method may be useful for future research. circumvents the demand responses to new goods before they become skilled-labor friendly; i.e. we 317 start from the knowledge that the relative skilled labor demand has increased at original factor prices.
Demiroglu
318
For example, new goods can be unskilled-labor friendly within the North either because they 
324
In addition, since induced preference changes may happen to the old southern goods, new 325 northern goods could change the South's relative skilled labor demand, μ*(ω*, g). Let ψ* denote 326 the change of μ*(.): Results for given changes in relative factor demand t1:2 t1:3
Notes: By Proposition A1, the results in this table hold under CES preferences. Γ is the country friendliness of new goods and Γ N 0 if new goods increase the relative demand for the North's factors. ψ* is the factor friendliness of new goods in the South and ψ* N 0 if new goods increase the South's relative skilled labor demand. ψ is the factor friendliness of new goods in the North and ψ N 0 if new goods increase the North's relative skilled labor demand. w s / w u and w s * / w u * are the northern and the southern skill premia. g is the common good both the North and the South produce; when g increases, the North produces a narrower range of goods and the South produces a wider range of goods. When w s / w u , w s * / w u * or g does not appear in a cell, this variable may increase or decrease. A "-" indicates that all the 3 variables, w s / w u , w s * / w u * and g, may increase or decrease. t1:18 friendly within the South if ψ* b 0 and factor-neutral within the South if ψ* = 0, where ψ* ≡ μ*′ 329 (ω*, g) − μ*(ω*, g).
330
ψ* is evaluated at the constant factor price ω*.
331
As shown in the Mathematical Appendix: The intuition of Propositions 3 and 4 is similar to that of Propositions 1 and 2. To facilitate 343 using Propositions 3 and 4, they are presented in Table 1 .
5 Table 1 also shows the results
344
concerning the change in g. 
358
To be rigorous, totally differentiate the log of μ(.) at constant factor prices: Likewise, differentiate the logs of μ*(.) and Λ(.) at constant factor prices:
367 368 Step 2: given these changes in relative factor demand, how do new goods change 388 the northern skill premium? Consult Table 1 : the skill premium decreases, in contrast to Section 3.
389
Thus, the PIR breaks the link between the skilled-labor intensity of the new goods and their 390 factor friendliness, and the link between where they are produced and their country friendliness.
391
However, Eqs. (10)-(12) suggest a way to remove the PIR and restore those links.
392
Definition 6. The induced preference changes are PIR-free if (a)
In other words, the induced preference changes are PIR-free if the "complementarities" be- When the preferences are CES, the goods' expenditure shares are endogenous: they depend on 434 the goods' prices and only on the goods' prices. Since the goods' prices equal their marginal 435 costs, which are determined by the factor prices, the goods' expenditure shares are determined by 436 factor prices. Thus, at constant factor prices, the equilibrium conditions (Eqs. (2)- (5)) and the 437 definitions of factor friendliness and country friendliness still hold, and so do the definitions of 438 preference neutrality and being PIR-free. Therefore:
439
Proposition A1. Propositions 1-5 and Table 1 are valid under CES preferences.
440
The formal proof of Proposition A1 is in the Mathematical appendix. The Mathematical
441
Appendix also shows that Proposition A1 holds when the number of goods in the model is finite
442
and/or when new goods are not infinitesimal changes.
443
A.2. A2 Applying the two-step solution method to other comparative static exercises
444
The two-step solution method simplifies the analyses of many other comparative static 445 exercises in the two-cone HO model because the results derived for step 2, Table 1 , can be used
